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POLICE IMPLEMENTATION OF
SUPREME COURT OF CANADA
CHARTER DECISIONS: AN
EMPIRICAL STUDY©
By KATHRYN MOORE*

Little empirical research has been done on the Charter's impact on the public
policy process. This paper presents the results of an empirical research study
designed to fill that gap. The study examined the manner in which a municipal
police force and the RCMP implemented changes to procedures following two
Supreme Court of Canada Charter decisions. The paper concludes that, while
steps have been taken to develop a process by which Supreme Court decisions
are implemented, the process would be improved if one body were allocated
responsibility for the provision of interim information to the police.

I. INTRODUCTION

............................................................

548

II. THE IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS ...........................................

550

III. PARTICIPANTS IN THE PROCESS ............................................

554

IV. BRYDGES AND DUARTE ....................................................

560

V. POLICE RESPONSES TO BRYDGES AND DUARTE ............................
A. Brydges ...................................................................
B. Duarte ...................................................................

562
563
567

© Copyright, 1992, Kathryn Moore.
Member of the 1990 graduating class of Osgoode Hall Law School. I want to thank Marc
Gold, Alan Grant, Patrick Monahan, and the Centre for Research on Public Law and Public Policy
at Osgoode Hall Law School, without whose help and support this project could not have been
completed. Thanks also to Alan Young, Anthony Doob, and David Northrup for their invaluable
input and advice. Finally, I want to thank all the people whom I interviewed for their generous
contribution of time to the interviews and for their interest in the project. All errors and omissions
are, of course, mine.

548

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

VI. EVALUATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

..................................

VII. CONCLUSION ..............................................................

[VOL 30 No. 3
570
577

I. INTRODUCTION
Since the enactment of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms1 in 1982, vast tracts have been written analyzing its impact on
the law, legal and political institutions, and the public policy process.
The policy analysis has remained essentially speculative. There has been
little empirical research on the extent to which the Charter has become a
factor in government policy development, its influence on the choice of
policy type and instrument, the impact of judicial decisions and
government policies that have been developed with an eye to the
Charter'srequirements, nor on the manner in which these decisions and
policies are implemented. 2 This paper presents the results of an
empirical research project, which will begin to fill this gap in the
understanding of the Charter'simpact on Canada's policy process.
This project gathered information on how police implement
Supreme Court Charter decisions affecting their operations. Three
major issues were considered: first, the allocation of responsibility for
policy making and implementation among the Ministry of the Solicitor
General, the Ministry of the Attorney General, and the police; second,
the procedure for the development of a response; third, the
implementation procedure for these policies and the dissemination of
information to individual police officers.
A comprehensive examination of the police process used to
implement Supreme Court decisions was beyond this project's scope.
Instead, a case study approach was adopted. In the fall of 1990,
interviews were conducted with a medium-sized municipal police force
in Ontario, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 3 and a number of
1 Part I of the ConstitutionAct, 1982, being Schedule B to the CanadaAct 1982 (U.K), 1982, c.

11 [hereinafter Charter].
2 See M.L Friedland, "Controlling the Administrators of Criminal Justice" (1988-89) 31 Crim.
LQ. 280 at 281. Friedland points out that there has been little empirical examination of any area of

law.
3 Hereinafter RCMP.
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government officials. R. v. Duarte4 and R. v. Brydges,5 two recent
Supreme Court judgments, served as the focus for the interviews and as
a basis for more general discussions about the implementation process.
This approach was chosen for several reasons. The Supreme
Court has been the most visible and prolific source of change since the
Its decisions, therefore, provide a useful
Charter's enactment.
touchstone for empirical research. Since many Charter decisions
mandated the reform of police practices, a research project on the police
was logical.
The implementation process was also targeted in the hope that
the research will provide a foundation for further academic study of the
police and the Charter'simpact. Participants in the process can use the
results to clarify their responsibilities and to consider the desirability of
reform. Judges need to be aware of this process so they can formulate
decisions that can be implemented effectively. Judges also require this
information to evaluate properly the good faith of the police under
section 24(2) of the Charter. Justice Sopinka implicitly recognized the
importance of the implementation process in R. v. Kokesch 6 where he
stated:
I do not wish to be understood as imposing upon the police a burden of instant
interpretation of court decisions. The question of the length of time after a judgment
that ought to be permitted to pass before knowledge of its content is attributed to the
police for the purposes of assessing good faith is an interesting one, but it does not arise
on these facts.

Finally, information about the implementation process will
provide a basis for further studies examining the nature of the Charter's
impact on the public policy process. Has the Charterresulted in "tidal
waves and earthquakes" in the institutions involved in the administration
of justice as the police struggle to cope with an "Americanized" system
of criminal procedure?8 Has the Charterbeen a successful agent for
4 [1990] 1 S.C.R. 30 [hereinafter Duarte]. See also the companion decision in R. v. Wiggins,
[1990] 1 S.C.R. 62.
5 [1990] 1 S.C.R. 190 [hereinafterBrydges].
6 [1990] 3 S.C.R. 3 at 33.
71bid.
8 See F. McGinn, "The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms: Its Impact on Law
Enforcement" (1982) 31 U.N.B.L.J. 177 at 181 and at 204: "Michael J. Murphy, former Police
Commissioner of New York State commented [in response to Mapp v. Ohio, 81 S.Ct. 1684 (1961)]
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progressive change? For example, does the process allow for the
circumvention of decisions 9 or, conversely, do participants develop new
practices reflecting the broad spirit behind the decision? The answers to
these questions are critical to an evaluation of the success of Charter
decisions:
The success of the courts in moulding a balanced, distinctively Canadian jurisprudence on
the Charter, and the manner in which these judicial holdings are taken up, absorbed,
institutionalized and given practical expression by the police in turn, will have a profound
10
bearing upon how free, even how democratic, our society actually is.

II. THE IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS

The traditional elements of the public policy process are
decision, implementation, impact, and evaluation. In the United States,
substantial amounts of theoretical and empirical work have been done
on the impact of decisions from the United States Supreme Court. 11
Much of the recent work in the impact area has focused on the
implementation process.1 2 These implementation studies provide
important information about why a particular decision has the observed
that decisions arrived at in the peace and tranquility of chambers in Washington, or elsewhere,
create tidal waves and earthquakes which require rebuilding of our institutions sometimes from
their very foundation upward. ... The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms contains remedies
that will create in law enforcement and the administration of justice a Canadian version of the 'tidal
waves and earthquakes' suffered by the New York Police Department after Mapp."
9 See supra note 2 at 282: "[Tlhere is usually some adjustment whenever a change has been
instituted. ... Some writers even claim that there is total compensation or "homeostasis" for the
change so that the status quo is maintained." See also D. Manwaring, "The Impact of Mapp v.
Ohio" in D.H. Everson, ed., The Supreme Court as Policy Maker: Three Studies on the Impact of
JudicialDecisions, 2d ed. (Carbondale: Public Affairs Research Bureau, Southern Illinois
University, 1972) 1 at 26:
When a new judicial policy is unpopular, however, when it is seen by police and judges alike as
unrealistic and fraught with danger, then it is inevitable that resort will be had to the many
avenues of revision and evasion which are always and inescapably ready at hand. The Court
cannot make its rulings popular; it can try to make them stick.
10 S.A. Cohen, "The Impact of Charter Decisions on Police Behaviour" 39 C.R. (3d) 264 at
264-65.
11 So much work has, in fact, been done on the impact of judicial decisions in the United
States that it is referred to as impact studies and is considered to be an interdisciplinary area
combining law, sociology, and political science.
12 See for example, T.V. Reid, "Judicial Policy-Making and Implementation: An Empirical
Examination" (1988) 41 W. Pol. Q. 509; and T.R. Marshall, "Policymaking and the Modern Court:
When do Supreme Court Rulings Prevail?" (1989) 42 W. Pol. Q. 493.
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impact. Since there has been little comparable work done in Canada,
American literature is a useful starting point for analysis of the
implementation process.
The use of policy theory is not necessarily based on the
assumption that judges are policy makers. 13 Policy theory and analysis is
as applicable to the implementation of judicial decisions as it is to the
implementation of traditional policy decisions.14 In fact, the importance
of the process used to implement judicial decisions is heightened by the
nature of judicial decision making itself. The role of the courts is to
react to cases brought before them and make decisions on the facts.
They have no mandate to try to make decisions more broadly applicable.
More importantly, they cannot modify decisions in response to
implementation problems or in response to feedback from the
participants.1 5 Decisions can only be altered in subsequent cases
provided that similar cases come before the court. Once decisions leave
the court they are subject, to some extent, to the whims of those charged
16
with their implementation.

13 On the issue of judges as policy makers, see, in addition to the materials already cited, R.A.
Dahl, "Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as National Policy-Maker" in M.M.
Shapiro, ed., The Supreme Court and Public Policy (Glenview: Scott, Foresman, 1969) 57; D.
Gibson, "Judges as Legislators: Not Whether But How" (1987) 25 Alta. L. Rev. 249; and R.S.
Abella, "Public Policy and the Judicial Role" (1989) 34 McGill LJ. 1021.
14 If judges are in fact policy makers, at least with respect to Charterdecisions, it is arguable
that they should play a more active role in the entire policy-making process. For example, if the
courts decide that a given practice is unconstitutional, it would not be unreasonable for them, once
that decision is made, to get input from the police about the best way to structure the decision so
that it can be easily implemented. How this could be accomplished in the present adversary system
is unclear. The Crown would probably be unwilling to present information "in the alternative" that
would inevitably undermine its argument. Section 1 evidence would be tailored to justify the
current police practice based, among other things, on the unavailability of alternatives. Section 1
does not, therefore, provide a useful vehicle for police perspectives on what the best alternative is.
It is theoretically possible for the police to seek intervener status. Interview with Halton Crown
attorney (26 October 1990) Halton Courthouse, Milton, Ontario. The public attitude towards such
a powerful police lobby, however, might dissuade the police from making this application. Interview
with members of the RCMP (10 December 1990) RCMP Headquarters, Ottawa, Ontario.
15 G.C. Edwards, Implementing Public Policy (Washington: Congressional Quarterly Press,
1980) at 159.
16
See F.J. Sorauf, "Zorach v. Clauson: The Impact of a Supreme Court Decision" in Shapiro,
supra note 13, 65 at 73: "To rephrase the old saw, the precedent in reality consists of what
influential partisans and decision-makers say the Supreme Court says it is."
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Elements of the policy process are clearly not isolated stages. 17
Nonetheless, implementation can be considered as a discrete step in the
life of a particular policy. When analyzing the implementation process,
the decision's merits are neither considered nor evaluated. The analysis
focuses on the decision's form and on whether the changes required
were accomplished. The elements of an effective implementation
process can be classified loosely into four categories: communication,
resources, dispositions, and bureaucratic structure.18
The most important element in the process of implementing
Supreme Court of Canada decisions is effective communication of
information to police. The police must know there has been a decision,
what it says, and what they have to do to conform to its requirements.
Decisions must be clear in order to meet these goals. Judicial decisions
are, by their very nature, vague and ambiguous. This lack of clarity may
impair effective implementation before the police receive the
information. The decision's transmission may be ineffective if it is
distorted en route, does not reach the police directly, or is selectively
screened by the person receiving it. Finally, decisions must be
consistent. If they are not, police discretion is increased and the Court's
goals are less likely to be met.
To be able to effect the required changes once they have been
communicated, police need ample resources. There must be adequate
numbers of sufficiently skilled staff to make the required decisions,
implement the changes, and, if necessary, monitor compliance. These
human resources must be supplemented by physical resources. Less
tangible resources are also required. The police need information on

17

See M.M. Atkinson & M.A. Chandler, "Strategies for Public Analysis" in M.M. Atkinson &
M.A. Chandler, eds., The Politicsof CanadianPublicPolicy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1983) 7 at 15, who point out that the policy process is not a straight, assembly-line process: "the
output of one stage of the policy process can serve as an input for the next."
18 The criteria for an effective implementation process and the factors that most often impede
successful implementation have been discussed in a number of recent, comprehensive analyses,
supra note 15. Edwards draws on the following discussion: C.A. Johnson & B.C. Canon, Judicial
Policies: Implementation and Impact (Washington: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1984); D.J.
Palumbo & D.J. Calisten, eds., Implementation and the Policy Process: Opening up the Black Box
(New York: Greenwood Press, 1990); T. Younis, ed., Implementation in PublicPolicy (Brookfield:
Gower Pub. Co., 1990); and R.A. Carp & R. Stidham, JudicialProcess in America (Washington:
Congressional Quarterly Press, 1990).
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what is specifically required to satisfy the Court's requirements
and the
19
authority to enforce compliance with changed procedures.
The attitude of the police is one of the most important factors
influencing a decision's implementation. If police do not agree with the
decision or think it will be difficult to implement, they will likely use any
discretion given to them to minimize the required changes. Ideally, this
impediment could be altered by instilling, through training, a positive
attitude in police towards the Charter and its goals. Alternatively, police
could be given positive incentives to comply or, as a last resort, police
could be subject to negative sanctions for non-compliance.
The bureaucratic structure is the final factor influencing the
extent to which decisions are effectively implemented. Bureaucratic
structures tend to be highly fragmented, resulting in "diffusion of
responsibility." 20 This fragmentation makes coordination among the
various units difficult and often results in duplication of effort.
Bureaucratic organizations also tend to rely heavily on "standard
operating procedures." 21 While these procedures save time and increase
consistency in decision making, they are often not amenable to change.
Each of these factors can work with others to multiply obstacles
to effective implementation. New and controversial policies face a
myriad of difficulties. Judicial decisions are also susceptible to
implementation problems: the channels of communication between the
Court and the police are decentralized and indirect; there is
fragmentation of responsibility for the development of a response to the
decision; and the courts have neither the authority nor the resources to
19 Some commentators have questioned whether police officers' compliance with certain
practices is always enforced:
If police officers violate a defendant's rights, the courts usually do not punish them, but merely
exclude the evidence illegally obtained. Since officers' superiors in the police department may
be quite sympathetic to their methods of obtaining evidence, they will probably be evaluated
on the basis of the number of arrests they make rather than on the convictions resulting from
these arrests. Thus, court sanctions will restrain police behaviour here only to the extent that
police officers mind losing convictions."
J.W. Doing, "Police Policy Behaviour: Patterns of Divergence" (Special Issue 1978) 7 Pol'y Stud. J.
436 at 438, cited in supra note 15 at 71; S.L. Wasby, "Police Training About Criminal Procedure:
Infrequent and Inadequate" (Special Issue 1978) 7 Pol'y Stud. J.461, cited in Edwards, supra note
15 at 109, agrees: "[plolice officers are seldom rewarded for compliance with Supreme Court
defendant rights decisions, nor are they often punished for noncompliance with them."
20
Supra note 15 at 137.
21

Ibid. at 130.
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monitor compliance with the decision, nor to exercise any immediate
control over those who implement it outside the judicial system. The
theoretical work thus suggests difficulties with two key elements of the
implementation process: the communication of information and the
allocation of responsibility.
III. PARTICIPANTS IN THE PROCESS
The identification of participants in the policy implementation
process was an important component of this research project. This task
was complicated by the perception among judges and academics that the
police are a monolithic, uniform body. In fact, as the results of this
research disclosed, there is wide variation in size and responsibilities
among police forces and among a number of other non-police
participants in the policy implementation process.
Provincial police forces in Canada are governed by provincial
statutes such as the Ontario Police Services Act, 1990.22 The police are
self-contained and politically independent? 3 Each police force is
responsible for modifying its procedures and is accountable only to its
own board. Most police forces are divided into three basic units:
operations, executive, and administration and support services (which
includes training). The training officer, or the training department in
larger forces, has the primary responsibility for disseminating
24
information about changes in procedures.

22 S.O. 1990, c. 10 [hereinafter Police Services Act, 1990]. The Police Services Act, 1990

replaces thePoliceAct, [hereinafterPoliceAct] R.S.O. 1980, c. 381. It was given Royal Assent on 28
June 1990; and sections 1 and 2 and Parts I-VI and VIII-X were proclaimed in force on 31

December 1990. The Police Services Act, 1990 makes substantial changes to the old Police Act,
including a declaration of six principles in section 1 to guide the provision of police services in

Ontario, one of which is the "importance of safeguarding the fundamental rights guaranteed by the
CanadianCharter of Rights and Freedoms and the Human Rights Code, 1981". The new Act also
clarifies the responsibilities of the Solicitor General with respect to policing, and creates the Ontario

Civilian Commission on Police Services to replace the Ontario Police Commission, which will
oversee both municipal boards and services to ensure compliance with certain standards.
23 See P.C. Stenning, Legal Status ofthe Police (Ottawa: Law Reform Commission of Canada,
1982) at 101-31, for a detailed examination of the case law relating to the concept of police
independence.

24 Interview with senior administrator (23 November 1990) Ontario Police College, Aylmer,
Ontario.
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The Ontario Police College 25 in Aylmer, Ontario is directly
accountable to the Policing Services Division of the Ministry of the
Solicitor General 2 6 The oPc trains all recruits in the province, except
recruits to the Metropolitan Toronto Police Force, and provides
specialized courses for more senior officers to upgrade their training.
The opc teaching staff is composed of permanent instructors and officers
seconded from other Ontario forces. Each of the instructors prepares
and updates the materials in the area for which he or she is responsible.
Over 90 per cent of opc course materials are prepared by the instructors
themselves.27 A well-developed internal communications system ensures
that instructors receive the periodical literature relevant to their area of
instruction and are thereby kept current with changes in the law. 28
The opc previously distributed in-service training packages to
training officers in the municipal police forces. These packages provided
the training officers with, among other things, information on changes in
the law and recommended responses. The distribution of these
packages was discontinued in 1988. The oc no longer proactively
disseminates information on new developments, nor is it looked to as a
primary resource for current information. 29 The opc maintains some
contact with officers in the field through materials distributed as
preparation for promotional examinations. Individual instructors also
maintain informal contacts with municipal police officers, Crown
attorneys, and members of the Ministry of the Attorney General. 30
Recently, the Opc commenced a long-term initiative to increase
their capability to provide immediate advice to municipal police forces in
response to judicial and legislative changes in the law. As part of that
initiative, the Ministry of the Solicitor General and the opc agreed that
opc instructors could develop teaching positions in response to changes
in the law. These teaching positions would identify and interpret
25

Hereinafter OPC.

26 Police Services Act, 1990, supra note 22, s. 3(2)1. Prior to the enactment of the Police

ServicesAct, 1990, the opc reported to the Ontario Police Commission.
27
28

Supra note 24.
Ibid.

29 Interview with counsel, Legal Branch (19 November 1990) Ministry of the Solicitor
General, Toronto, Ontario; and interview with senior officer (12 December 1990) Halton Regional
Police Force Headquarters, Oakville, Ontario.
30
Supra note 24.
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pertinent legal issues and include a recommended policy or procedure.
The positions are now used primarily by the instructors in the classroom
and sometimes by the Ministry of the Solicitor General in the
development of its legal opinions.31 The Ministry of the Solicitor
General agreed that the opinions could be disseminated outside the opc
in response to direct inquiries as long as the oPc made it clear that the
opinion was not a legal opinion and that the local Crown attorney should
always be consulted. These teaching positions agree with the legal
opinion subsequently developed "99.9 percent" of the time. 32
The RCMP are governed by the Royal CanadianMounted Police
33
Act. The responsibilities of the RCMP are divided into four main areas:
Operations, Law Enforcement Services and Protective Services,
Corporate Management, and Administration. Each area is headed by a
deputy commissioner 34 and is further divided into a number of
directorates with specialized responsibilities. The country is also divided
into regions or provinces headed by a commanding officer. Each
division is responsible for meeting individual regional needs as well as
fulfilling the general federal responsibilities of the RCMP.
Policy development is coordinated by the Operational Support
Secretariat (part of the Enforcement Services Directorate) and is
headed by a director who reports to the Deputy Commissioner,
Operations. 3S The secretariat is the father of policy development for the
RCMP while particular directorates have responsibility for policy

31 Interview with instructor (23 November 1990) OPC, Aylmer, Ontario.
32

Supra note 24.

33 R.S.C. 1985, c. R-10. For an examination of the constitutional basis for the allocation of
responsibility for policing between the federal government and the provinces, see A. Grant, The
Police-PolicyPaper (Ottawa: Law Reform Commission of Canada, 1980) at 16-20 and at 33-40.
Grant concludes that the provinces derive their authority over policing from section 92(14) (the
administration of justice), while the federal authority over the RCMP "appears to draw its

constitutional authority from the 'peace, order and good government' provision of s. 91." Ibid. at 17.
For a more detailed examination of the various Police Acts in Canada, see supra note 23 at 65-

100; P.C. Stenning, Trusting the Chief. LegalAspects of the Status and PoliticalAccountability of the
Police in Canada (S.J.D. Thesis, University of Toronto, 1983); and Canadian Centre for Justice
Statistics, Policingin Canada1986 (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1986).

34 Canada, Solicitor General, Annual Report (Ottawa: Solicitor General of Canada, 1990) at
21-37.
35 Interview with members of the RCMP, supra note 14. Note that the Operational Support

Secretariat was, at the time of the interviews, the Enforcement Support Branch.
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development in their areas of expertise. These individual directorates
are referred to aspolicy centres.
The Operational Support Secretariat contains the Special
Projects Section. At the time of the interviews, the section was headed
by a legally trained member responsible for monitoring Supreme Court
and Court of Appeal cases on criminal matters. Supreme Court criminal
cases were sent directly by the Court to the Law Enforcement Reference
Centre, and then brought to the attention of the appropriate policy
centre by the Operational Support Secretariat. Interestingly, since the
time of the interviews,
the Special Projects Section has been re-structured and the addition of personnel will
allow it to systematically review and disseminate Supreme Court of Canada and appeal
court decisions to the appropriate policy centre and divisions across the country within

days. Also, the court decisions will be received directly and not through the Law
Enforcement Reference Centre.

6

The RCMP obtains its legal advice from the Legal Services
Directorate. The directorate was created by an arrangement between
the RCMP and the Department of Justice in 1985. 3 7 All -lawyers are
seconded to the directorate by the Department of Justice. Although the
directorate has input into all legal matters affecting the RCMP, both it and
other areas of the RCMP continue to have direct contact with the
Department of Justice.
Although each police force is ultimately responsible for its own
decisions, other government organizations assume a great deal of
responsibility for keeping police forces informed and recommending
changes to procedures and practices. The three major organizations that
interact with police organizations on an ongoing basis are: Crown
attorneys; the Ministry of the Solicitor General and its federal
counterpart; and the Ministry of the Attorney General and its federal
counterpart, the Department of Justice.
The formal responsibilities and accountabilities of these
organizations are set out in various statutory provisions, such as the
Crown Attorneys Act,38 the Ministry of the Solicitor GeneralAct,39 and the
36

Letter from member of the RCMP to author (26 July 1991).

37

Interview with members of the RCMP, supra note 14.

38 R.S.O. 1980, c. 107.
39

R.S.O. 1980, c. 288.
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Ministry of the Attorney GeneralAct.40 Crown attorneys are responsible
for the conduct of prosecutions and they often develop a close working
relationship with police. When faced with legal dilemmas, it is to the
Crown attorneys that the police will first turn for advice. 41 The Crown
attorney is an officer of the court, however, not the lawyer for police.42
The Ministry of the Attorney General supervises all Crown
attorneys. The Attorney General superintends all matters connected
with the administration of justice and advises the government on all
matters of law affecting any arm of the government. 43 The Ministry of
the Attorney General in Ontario is divided into a number of divisions
including the Criminal Law Division. This division has primary
responsibility for overseeing Crown attorneys. This division also
includes the Crown Law Office, Criminal, and the Criminal Law Policy
section. These offices provide advice on criminal matters usually
indirectly through contacts in the Ministry of the Solicitor General or
through the local Crown attorney.
The Ontario Ministry of the Solicitor General is responsible for
the administration of the Police Services Act, 1990. It is the Ministry to
which police forces are indirectly accountable through the Ontario
Civilian Commission on Police Services. The Ministry's responsibilities,
at least with respect to policing, have been clarified in the new Police
Services Act, 1990. The duties and powers of the Solicitor General, listed
in section 3(2), include monitoring police practices, developing training
programs, issuing directives and guidelines respecting policy matters,
and operating the opc. The Act also gives the Ministry the power to

40 R.S.O. 1980, c. 271.
41 That this is so will be confirmed in Part V, below.

42 C. Lewis, "The Police and the Crown" in W.T. McGrath & M.P. Mitchell, eds., The Police
Function in Canada (Toronto: Methuen, 1981) 104 at 107.

43 The role of the Attorney General in the Canadian political and legal system has been the
subject of much comment and debate. For a recent, thorough examination of the subject, see Royal

Commission on the Donald Marshall Jr., Prosecution, Walking the Tightrope of Justice: An
Examination of the Office of Attorney General in Canada by J.L1. J. Edwards (1989). See also I.

Scott, "Law, Policy, and the Role of the Attorney General: Constancy and Change in the 1980s"
(1989) 39 U.T.LJ. 109.
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impose definite sanctions for non-compliance with directives. 44
Previously, the Ministry had to rely on "moral persuasion." 45
Two segments of the Ministry of the Solicitor General are
directly involved in the policy implementation process. First, on a
technical level, the Policing Services Division disseminates information
to the various police forces and other police organizations through
Police Information
various channels. One such channel is the Canadian
47
Centre,46 the police communications network.
Secondly, the Legal Branch, within the Policy and Program
Development Division of the Ministry Office, provides legal services to
the entire Ministry. The Legal Branch "assists in the development of
policy and provides legal opinions and advice." 48 Although lawyers in
the Legal Branch are technically seconded from the Ministry of the
Attorney General (as are all lawyers working in the government), the
Legal Branch works closely with and relies on the Attorney General's
office. The Legal Branch interprets statutes and regulations, and
prepares and reviews proposed legislation, regulations, legal documents,
and litigation.
Despite the clarity with which these formal responsibilities are
established, it is the informal connections between the government and
the police organizations and the conventional modes of operating
developed over time, which accurately reflect the role each of these
institutions plays in the implementation process. Predictably, this
informal role is the most difficult for researchers to discover.
For example, the appropriate role of the Legal Branch when
advising police is controversial. There is no agreement on what the
Legal Branch's role should be and little on what its role actually is. One
individual interviewed suggested that the Criminal Law Division of the
Ministry of the Attorney General had primary responsibility for
interpreting those judicial decisions affecting the police. Ongoing legal
advice should be provided by the municipal solicitor or the Crown
44

PoliceServices Act, 1990, supra note 22, s. 22.

45 Interview with counsel, Legal Branch, supra note 29.
46

Hereinafter CPIC.

47 Interview with counsel, Legal Branch (13 December 1990) Ministry of the Solicitor
General, Toronto, Ontario.

48 Ontario, Ministry of the Solicitor General, Annual Report of the Solicitor General(Toronto:
1987) at 4.
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attorney.49 Other participants in the process agreed with this
characterization of the current responsibilities of the Legal Branch, but
some expressed the opinion that a more active role for the Legal Branch
might be helpful. It was suggested that the Legal Branch could develop
timely, definitive opinions for the police.50 Whether the Legal Branch
consulted with the Ministry of the Attorney General would then be an
internal matter, which would not shift ultimate responsibility for
developing a response. It was recognized that this would not solve the
problem of what the police should do while awaiting a legal opinion
from the Legal Branch.
IV. BRYDGES AND DUARTE
The choice of Brydges and Duarte as sample cases was premised
on several assumptions. First, because they are recent, well-publicized 51
decisions, it was assumed that they would still be fresh in the minds of
the study's participants and that pertinent documentation would be
easily accessible. Rather than prohibiting a particular behaviour-as
occurred in R. v. Hebert2-both cases imposed a new requirement on
the police. As a result, it was thought that a more extensive process
would be required to implement the necessary changes. The two cases
can be usefully contrasted with each other. Brydges, a relatively simple
case, allowed police a transition period to make the necessary changes.
Duarte,a more complex decision, changed the law immediately.
Brydges and Duartewill not be considered in detail. The focus of
this study is not traditional legal analysis, but rather the issues that the
participants perceived to be important. Several commentaries provide a

49
50
51

Interview with counsel, Legal Branch, supra note 29.
Supra note 24.

As an example of the publicity surrounding the two cases, the Toronto Star cited Biydges and
Duarte as two of four cases decided by the Supreme Court in the previous year that made the
"police forces [the] biggest losers over the year." "Supreme Court smiled on women, natives"
Toronto Star (14 July 1990) D4.
52 [1990] 2 S.C.R. 151.
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concise analysis of both cases 53 Briefly, the Supreme Court held in
Brydges that "as part of the information component of section 10(b) of
the Charter, a detainee should be informed of the existence and
availability of the applicable systems of duty counsel and Legal Aid in
the jurisdiction, in order to give the detainee a full understanding of the
right to retain and instruct counsel." 54 This right exists whether or not
the detainee has expressed concern over the affordability of a lawyer.
The Supreme Court gave the police a thirty-day transition period to
make the requisite changes to their cautions. The implementation of
this apparently straightforward conclusion was immediately complicated
by the fact that, at the time, duty counsel systems typically were not
available immediately to an accused at a police station.55
In Duarte, the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of
a police practice known as "participant or consent surveillance." Part VI
of the Criminal Code regulates electronic surveillance s6 Section 184(1)
57
makes it an offence for anyone to intercept private communications.
Section 184(2) permits interception only if judicial authorization has
been obtained or if one of the participants in the private conversation
consented to its interception. 58 The Supreme Court ruled that
surveillance by an instrumentality of the state without prior judicial
authorization was unconstitutional even if one of the participants
consented to the interception. No meaningful distinction could be
drawn between the expectations of privacy at stake in participant
surveillance and third-party surveillance and, therefore, the same
standard must apply to both. In Duarte, the evidence of the intercepted
conversation was admissible because the police officers relied in good
faith on the provisions of the Criminal Code. The good faith of the
53
See, for example, P.B. Michalyshyn, "Brydges: Should the Police Be Advising of the Right
to Counsel?" (1990) 74 C.R. (3d) 151; S.A. Cohen, "Not as Easy as it Seems: Closing the Consent
Loophole"(1990) 74 C.R. (3d) 304; and M. Rabideau, "Duartev.R.: In Fear of Big Brother" (1991)
49 U.T. Fac. L. Rev. 171.
54

Supra note 5 at 215.
55 Statistics Canada, Legal Aid in Canada 1985 (Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Justice
Statistics, 1986). In Alberta, where the Brydges case originated, "there was no duty counsel scheme
in place enabling immediate consultation." See Michalyshyn, supra note 53 at 155.
56
R.S.C.1985, c. C-46.
57
58

Ibid.
Ibid.
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police officers outweighed the seriousness of the Charterviolation and
the fact that proper authorization could have been obtained.
Duarte left three questions unanswered. First, how were police
to obtain an authorization under section 186(1) if one of the participants
consented to the interception? This problem arose because section
186(1) specifies that an authorization can only be given if other
investigative means have been tried and have failed, are unlikely to
succeed, or are impractical because of urgency. The existence of a
consenting party would always be the other investigative means since the
consenting party could testify in court about the conversation. Second,
section 186(1) had been judicially interpreted to require the police to
have reasonable and probable grounds in order to obtain an
authorization.5 9 In practice, participant surveillance is often used as a
preliminary investigative tool. Were the police to be prevented from
using electronic surveillance in this manner? Finally, did the ruling in
Duarte apply only to the recording of conversations or to both recording
and monitoring? Part VI of the Criminal Code draws no distinction
between the two, but the decision in Duarte refers consistently to the
recording of private communications. This issue was of great concern to
the police because of the importance of electronic surveillance to officer
safety.
V. POLICE RESPONSES TO BRYDGES AND DUARTE
The main purpose of this study was to obtain empirical
information on police implementation of Supreme Court decisions. A
sample of individuals representing most of the participants in the
implementation process was interviewed. Representatives of the Halton
Regional Police Force and the RCMP were interviewed. Interviews were
also conducted with two Crown attorneys and representatives of both
the provincial Ministry of the Solicitor General and the Ministry of the
Attorney General.
Interviews were conducted between October and December

59

1986].

R v. Finlay (1985), 23 D.L.R. (4th) 532 (Ont. C.A.) [Leave to appeal refused 28 February
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1990 and were generally in person, one-to-one meetings. 60 The
conversations were structured informally around a series of questions
tailored to the interviewee's particular responsibilities. These general,
open-ended questions were designed to lead the conversation to desired
topics rather than to elicit detailed information. This method of
obtaining information proved advantageous, both because clarification
and detail could easily be requested and because information not
anticipated by the formal questions was obtained.
Since the information obtained from these interviews was
descriptive rather than statistical, it is presented best in a narrative
format. A chronological overview of the police response to Brydges and
Duarte, describing what really happened, will be presented.
A. Biydges
The judgment in Brydges was released 1 February 1990. Early
the next morning, a lawyer in the Legal Branch at the Ministry of the
Solicitor General read about the decision in the Toronto Star. After
counsel at the Ministry of the Attorney General were contacted, the
Ministry assumed primary responsibility for the development of new
wording for police cautions to detainees. The Ministry of the Solicitor
61
General was to provide legal and practical input on draft wordings.
The Ministry of the Attorney General sent a memorandum to all Crown
attorneys in the province on 5 February 1990. The memorandum

60 For more information on interview method and research design in general, see N.M.
Bradburn & S. Sudman, Improving Interview Method and QuestionnaireDesign (San Francisco:
Jossey-Bass, 1979); J.D. Fitzgerald & M. Cox, Research Methods in CriminalJustice: An Introduction
(Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1987); V. Jupp, Methods of CriminologicalResearch (London: Unwin
Hyman, 1989); and D.L. Jorgensen, Participant'Observation: A Methodology for Human Studies
(Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage, 1989).

61 This allocation of responsibility between the Ministry of the Solicitor General and the
Ministry of the Attorney General is quite common. R. v. Askov, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1199, was given as
another example of this type of arrangement between the Ministry of the Solicitor General and the
Ministry of the Attorney General. Since the decision in Askov was directed at the courts, the
Attorney General naturally took the lead in developing a response. The decision, however, also had
an impact on the police. For example, accelerating trial dates would force the police to assume
additional costs and to work overtime to appear in court, to provide the necessary security, and to

serve additional subpoenas. The Solicitor General, therefore, provided input to the Attorney
General on the problems facing the police.
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summarized Brydges and advised that new wording was being prepared. 62
On 8 February 1990, the Assistant Deputy Minister of the Ministry of
the Solicitor General sent a similar cPIc message to all police chiefs.
Over the next ten days, the Ministry of the Attorney General
consulted with the Ministry of the Solicitor General and considered
proposals from other provinces. Proposed wording was in place by 14
February 1990 and was circulated for comment. On 16 February 1990,
the arrest coordinator was requested to begin the development of a
teaching position to serve as an interim policy until final wording was
obtained from the Ministry of the Solicitor General. 63
The wording was formally approved by the Ministry of the
Attorney General on 1 March and was sent to the Assistant Deputy
Minister of the Ministry of the Solicitor General. Before the
information could be distributed to the police, a French translation and
a Legal Aid, 1-800 telephone number were required. Prior to the release
of the Brydges decision, the Ontario Legal Aid Plan had established a 1800 number in the Metropolitan Toronto area, giving persons detained
at police stations in Toronto access to duty counsel twenty-four hours a
day. Expansion plans were accelerated in response to Brydges, but
problems with Bell Canada delayed the implementation of the 1-800
number until the beginning of March. 64
The deadline imposed by the Supreme Court was reached on 2
March. Since this was a Friday, there was concern that the police would
not have the information necessary to make the appropriate warnings
for arrests made that night. The new wording, absent the French
translation but including the telephone number, was sent out over cic
on Friday in the form of a Provincial Alert. The Alert explicitly stated
that the proposed wording was "the recommendation of the Ministry of
the Attorney General." 65

62 Note that Supreme Court decisions are generally sent to the Ministry of the Attorney
General in Toronto by its agents in Ottawa, and then copies of the decision are sent to Crown
attorneys throughout the province. Interview with Regional Director of Crown Attorneys, Central
South Region (7 November 1990) Courthouse, Hamilton, Ontario.
63 The OPC, its role in the information dissemination process, and the nature of its teaching
positions are discussed above.
64 Telephone interview with Deputy Director, Ontario Legal Aid Plan (12 November 1990);
and supra note 47.
65
Halton Regional Police Force, computer bulletin, Alert message, received 2 March 1990.
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This information was received by the Halton Regional Police and
was brought to the attention of the training officer. A bulletin was
entered into the force's Halton computer system to advise all members
of new information including changes to procedures and practices.
Terminals are located throughout the station and in most patrol cars.
Police officers are required to check the computer when they begin their
shifts and are deemed to have knowledge of the bulletins. 66 The Halton
Regional Police Force received a memorandum from the local Crown
attorney on 12 March 1990, which included a copy of the cpic message.
The French translation was completed 12 March and, as with the
new wording, was sent to the Assistant Deputy Minister of the Ministry
of the Attorney General. On 15 March, a second cPic was sent updating
the original cplc of 2 March. This bulletin included the new wording in
English and French, the 1-800 number for duty counsel from Legal Aid,
and additional information on the proper use of the duty counsel
telephone number. The Assistant Deputy Minister sent a memorandum
to all chiefs of police and the Commissioner of the Ontario Provincial
Police on 28 March 1990. This memorandum repeated the 15 March
cpic and enclosed cards containing right to counsel information.
Prior to the Brydges decision and the implementation of the
province-wide duty counsel number, the number in Toronto received an
average of 300 calls per month.6 7 After 1 April 1990 (the beginning of
the fiscal year, which almost coincides with the 1 March deadline
established in Brydges), the Toronto number averaged 550 to 600 calls
per month. Outside Toronto, the 1-800 number averaged 700 to 800
calls per month. All together, 9,091 people were assisted by emergency
duty counsel between 1 April and 31 October 1990 at an average cost of
$11.69 per person.
Subsequent judicial decisions have given the original
implementors feedback on the adequacy of their response and this
feedback has started the implementation process cycle again. For
example, in late 1990, Justice Houghton of the Supreme Court of British

66

Apparently, the "Hill Street Blues" roll-call meeting method of disseminating information

is old-fashioned and no longer used. Interview with senior officer, supra note 29. Some forces will
post bulletins to keep police officers informed; some detachments of the Ontario Provincial Police

have required officers to sign the standing order once they have read it. In this way, the force
ensures that officers stay current. Supra note 62.
67
All numbers were obtained from the Deputy Director, Ontario Legal Aid Plan.
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Columbia held that Brydges requires police officers to inform detainees
that some lawyers offer free first consultations6 After reading about
the case in Lawyers Weekly, a lawyer in the Legal Branch obtained a copy
of the decision and sent it to the Crown Law Office, Criminal. On 9
December 1990, the Crown Law Office concluded that the case was
probably an aberration and that additional changes to the wording were
not required. The Legal Branch agreed with the Crown Law Office's
decision. The case is not binding in Ontario and it is not a Court of
Appeal decision. Therefore, it does not have sufficient legal weight in
Ontario. Police forces were not informed of either the case or of the
decision that no response was required.
In two very recent cases from the Ontario Court of Justice
(General Division), judges have ruled that the right to counsel caution
developed in response to Brydges was incomplete and, therefore, those
accused were not informed adequately of their right to counsel. In both
R. v. Bautista69 and R. v. Baldwin,70 the Court ruled that the caution was
inadequate because it did not clearly convey to the accused that legal aid
was free and could be accessed immediately. In anticipation of these
difficulties, in June 1992, the Ontario Solicitor General advised
provincial police forces to change the standard caution to include the 171
800 Legal Aid number.
Although each RCMP division would ultimately adopt the wording
approved by the provincial Ministry of the Attorney General, RCMP
headquarters developed a suggested response to the case. Within three
days of the Biydges decision, the Enforcement Support Branch was
informed of the decision by the officer in charge of the branch, who had
read about the decision in the newspaper. On 9 February 1990, the
Enforcement Support Branch forwarded information on the decision to
the Contract Policing Branch, 72 the policy centre for issues involving
arrest procedures. The Contract Policing Branch disseminated this
preliminary information to all divisions.
68 R. v. Bethune (15 October 1990), (B.C.S.C.) [unreported] [hereinafter Bethune]. See M.
Zapf, "B.C. cops should have mentioned free lawyer consults?" Lawyers Weekly (7 December 1990)
11.
69 (21 October 1992), Toronto 2276.

70 (15 September 1992), Milton 2178.
71 The Lawyers Weekly (13 November 1992) 16.

72 Now the General Enforcement Branch.
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The Contract Policing Branch contacted the Legal Services
Branch on 13 February. Over the next ten days the two branches
reviewed the decision and developed proposed wording. Legal Services
contacted lawyers in the Department of Justice for their input and final
wording was developed by 23 February. On 26 February, direction was
sent, through cIC, to all divisions suggesting the appropriate wording
and a French translation.
B. Duarte
The judgment in Duarte was released on 25 January 1990.
Within a day, all police forces in the province were advised by a cPic
message from the Criminal Investigation Services, Ontario7 3 that
consent interceptions may be illegal and/or that an authorization may be
required. Halton received a copy of the decision approximately three
weeks later. After scouring the text, it was determined that the apparent
distinction drawn by the Supreme Court of Canada between recording
and monitoring was significant. Halton concluded, therefore, that
interception of communications with the consent of one of the
participants was satisfactory if the police only monitored, not
permanently recorded, the conversation.
A Halton Crown attorney confirmed this conclusion in a
memorandum received by the Halton Police Force on 12 March 1990.
The memorandum was written to clarify decisions made at an earlier
meeting between the police and the Crown's office. It stated that, in
emergencies, conversations could be monitored and recorded if
authorization was obtained at a later date. In non-emergency situations
absent authorization, conversations could be monitored, but not
recorded, for the purpose of preserving officer safety. The orc took a
similar approach.74
During this time, a small group within the Criminal Law Policy
section of the Ministry of the Attorney General began to develop a
policy. The input of those police forces most affected by the Duarte
decision-the RCMP, the Ontario Provincial Police, and the Metropolitan
Toronto Police Force-was sought. The individual in charge of the
73 Hereinafter CISO.
74

Supra note 31.

-
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investigation unit was contacted and asked to develop questions. It
should be noted that each of these forces has significant resources to
develop their own responses to decisions. The Metropolitan Toronto
Police Force, for example, employs a lawyer. While the policy's
development continued, the Ministry of the Attorney General provided
ongoing advice regarding the use of participant surveillance to Crown
attorneys and, indirectly, to the police.
Counsel at the Ministry of the Attorney General, unlike the
Halton Regional Police Force and the Halton Crown attorney, were
developing a broad interpretation of the Duarte decision. In their view,
no reasonable distinction could be drawn between recording and
monitoring. They felt this distinction did not accord with the decision's
reasons and was not consistent with the broad definition of "intercept"
in Part VI of the CriminalCode.75 As a result, counsel concluded that a
judicial authorization was required for all interceptions.
Over the next few months, formal and informal connections were
exploited to develop an appropriate response. Formal meetings were
held, on average, every two months with representatives from various
police forces, members of the Ministry of the Solicitor General and the
Ministry of the Attorney General, and ciso.76 Halton also informally
contacted other police forces to determine their response. Halton
obtained a copy of an authorization often used by the Metropolitan
Toronto Police Force as an example of an appropriate response.
Halton received a morass of conflicting advice from these
contacts. Rather than attempting to issue general instructions to all
police officers, Halton relied on the established procedure for the use of
any type of electronic surveillance, which operated as a check on the
unconstitutional use of participant surveillance. In the wake of Duarte,
the Intelligence Bureau required an officer in a participant surveillance
situation to turn off the recorder when an individual who was present
was not aware the conversation was being recorded.
Halton remained unclear on the appropriate direction it should
take until mid-summer when it received a copy of a legal opinion
prepared by the federal Assistant Deputy Attorney General for the
75

Supra,, note 56, s. 183.
76 For example, on 31 May 1990, the Ontario Provincial Police hosted the 1990 Southern

Ontario Fraud Seminar for investigators from various fraud units at which Duarte was one of two
major topics of discussion.
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Deputy Commissioner, Operations of the RCMP. The opinion, dated 9
July 1990, was a comprehensive review of the Duarte decision and its
implications for the use of participant surveillance in different situations.
It concluded that a meaningful distinction could not be drawn between
monitoring and recording or interception for evidential and safety
purposes. Thus, authorization was required for participant surveillance
except, possibly, in exigent circumstances. While the opinion was not
binding on Ontario municipal police forces, it was the most authoritative
and comprehensive direction yet received. Halton subsequently decided
to incorporate this opinion into the standing order on participant
surveillance then being developed.
On 25 January 1990, the same day as the decision, the Special
Services Branch-the RCMP policy centre responsible for electronic
surveillance-received a copy of the judgment from the Prince Edward
Island division.7 7 The Special Services Branch disseminated a telex to all
divisions on 26 January. This telex suggested that all one-party consent
surveillances be discontinued. The tentative wording does not reflect
uncertainty about the implications of the Duarte decision. It would have
been improper for the Special Services Branch to direct Division
Commanders, senior officers in the RCMP hierarchy, to do anything.78
By 30 January, the Special Services Branch had developed and
forwarded a draft policy to the Legal Services Branch for review. The
Special Services Branch wrote to the Enforcement Support Branch on 9
February and confirmed the basic outlines of the policy being developed.
Legal Services approved an interim policy by 21 February and subsequently disseminated it to all divisions. The input of all directorates in
headquarters was obtained and considered during the policy's
development.
The RCMP National Policy on electronic surveillance was
amended on 21 March. All electronic surveillance was prohibited unless
prior judicial authorization under Part VI of the CriminalCode had been
obtained. This policy applied whether the purpose of the interception
was obtaining evidence or the safety of officers. The importance of
intercepting the communications was based on the need to corroborate
77

Note that the members interviewed could not explain why the first division to pick up the

reasons in an appeal from an Ontario case was in Prince Edward Island. They pointed out instead
how this demonstrated that every division keeps an eye out for important developments.
78

Interview with members of the RCMP, supranote 14.
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the informant's testimony. Legal Services forwarded its final legal
opinion to the Special Services Branch on 11 July and a copy was sent to
all divisions on 23 July. Revisions to the standard manuals were
approved and implemented in due course.
Although not directly part of the implementation process, the
RCMP also responded by informally lobbying the Department of Justice
to make changes to Part VI of the Criminal Code. Members of the
Enforcement Services Branch and the Special Services Branch decided
to use the Duarte decision as a focus for broader discussions on the need
for legislative amendments to Part VI. Although the Department of
Justice was open to the suggestions of the RCMP, it was unwilling to act
before the Supreme Court decided R. v. Wong 79 and R. v. Garofoli.80 At
that time, the Department of Justice anticipated that a long-term
overhaul of the Part IV provisions would be required.
More than a year after the Duarte decision, police across the
country were unsure whether the decision applied only to electronic
recording or to monitoring as well. The issue is of pressing concern to
police forces since they feel their safety in dangerous situations is
compromised'if they are not monitored by electronic surveillance. 81
VI. EVALUATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
While police have always had to respond to changes in the law,
the pace of this change has historically been slow. Since the Charter's
adoption, the police have been forced to modify their practices more
often, faster, and with less warning. Eventually, practices are modified
in accordance with the spirit of judicial decisions. As might be expected,
the RCMP have an efficient and centralized approach to police
implementation of judicial decisions. At the municipal level, however,
the implementation process did not always function in a timely and
accurate manner. Participants themselves agreed that the system
required improvements. The most serious problems arose in the interim

79 [1990] 3 S.C.R. 36.
80 [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1421.
81 P. Moon, "Ruling removes 'life line', police say" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (26 July
1991) Al.
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between the decision and the final legal opinion, when police are left
with little guidance.
Three critical elements for a successful implementation process
are in place: communications systems, positive attitudes, and physical
and human resources. The participants have cpic, a technically
sophisticated communications system, through which information is
widely disseminated in a timely fashion. Internal communications
systems are also strong. The Halton Regional Police Force makes active
use of computer technology, and the opc has a well-developed
periodicals distribution system. The Ministry of the Solicitor General
provides concise, constant information in its Policing Services Division
Newsletter.82 All participants make extensive use of the media. Less
formal communications networks among personal friends and
acquaintances are also an effective means of disseminating information.
The negative attitude of those responsible for implementation is
suggested by the theoretical work as an impediment to an effective
implementation process. This factor was recognized by one participant
83
who noted the importance of "selling" the Charterto the police. Most
of the comments, however, reflected the positive attitude of the
interviewee to the Charter. Some expressed the belief that the Charter
4
had been beneficial to the police because it ensured professionalismP
Others commented that police officers, in their professional capacity, did
not care whether the Charter existed or not so long as somebody told
them exactly what they had to do in order to comply with its
requirements.85 The most scathing criticism levelled by an interviewee
was that the Canadian criminal procedure system was becoming totally
Americanized. 8 6 Although sophisticated research is required to
determine accurately the attitudes of the police and the impact of these

82

Supra note 24.

83

]bid.

84

Ibid.

85 Interview with senior officer (15 November 1990) Halton Regional Police Force
headquarters, Oakville, Ontario.
86
Ibid. Interview with members of the RCMP, supranote 14.
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attitudes on the implementation process,8 7 these comments provide
some indication that attitudes are not a significant impediment to
implementation.
The theoretical work suggests that the complexity of judicial
decisions might impair the implementation process. Interestingly, the
clarity of the decisions did not seem to be of pressing concern to the
participants, nor was it viewed as a solution to the implementation
problems facing police. In fact, until they were directly asked, most
interviewees never mentioned the complexity of decisions as a source of
difficulty. When concern was expressed, it focused on the discretion
conferred on police by ambiguous decisions. One interviewee suggested
that the complexity in Duarte was beneficial because it gave the police
room to manoeuvre.88 Other interviewees were more concerned with
the possibility that police officers would be able to evade the spirit of
particular Supreme Court decisions.
Finally, participants have access to a wide array of physical and
human resources. Police forces have extensive practical insight into the
problems associated with the use of electronic surveillance, for example.
Government ministries employ large numbers of lawyers with
constitutional and criminal law expertise.
Despite the strengths of these elements of the implementation
process, other elements of the implementation process at the municipal
level were considerably weaker. The failure to allocate responsibility
and a lack of information impair the effective and timely
implementation of Supreme Court decisions by the police.
The police are fully responsible for their own policy development
and implementation. Responsibility for the final decision on the proper
response to a Supreme Court decision, the manner in which that
response is implemented, and the monitoring of compliance rests with
the individual police force. Nonetheless, when Supreme Court decisions
change police practices, the police need accurate information to help
guide their decisions.

87

See generally M. Gold et al., Public Perceptionsof Justice: The Exclusion of Evidence Under
the Charter(Centre for Research on Public Law and Public Policy, 1990) [unpublished]; and J.F.
Fletcher, "Mass and Elite Attitudes about Wiretapping in Canada: Implications for Democratic
Theory and Politics" (1989) 53 Pub. Opinion Q. 225.
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The interviewees took the position that the collection of
information concerning judicial and statutory developments is a role
outside the modern function of community policing. Senior officers in
the Halton Regional Police Force were adamant that the major problem
with the implementation process was the failure of other components in
the system for the administration of justice to take responsibility for
informing police. One senior officer stated that under the current
acting to the collective detriment of the
system the participants "are
89
whole."
a
judicial system as
No other organization is responsible for providing that
information. Participants at the municipal level unanimously agreed
90
that no "emergency response team" similar to the Special Projects
Section of the RCMP existed to monitor the courts for change and to
swing into action when a decision was released. This ad hoc approach to
implementation, while potentially effective, appeared to be the primary
reason municipal police were not able to obtain the interim information
91
required. Police rely on external sources, primarily the media, to learn
about the existence of a decision and are then given little interim advice
or direction pending the completion of a legal opinion. The information
they do receive must be actively sought out. The transitional period
provided in Brydges appears to be a recognition of that problem, and it is
becoming a more common practice.
The lack of information was a related problem impairing the
operation of the implementation process. Although the structural
mechanisms for communication were in place, they were not being used.
First, many participants in the process were not aware of work being
done by others and thus needed information about the implementation
process itself. The Crown attorneys interviewed, identified by others as
front-line information sources for the police, were unsure what formal or
informal systems were in place to assist the police. One attorney
assumed that there was a constant flow of information from the Ministry
of the Solicitor General. 92 A senior administrator with the Ontario
Police College did not know that the Ministry of the Solicitor General
89

Supra note 85.

90

A term used by counsel, Legal Branch.
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Supra note 24.

92 Interview with Halton Crown attorney, supra note 14.
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was working in conjunction with the Ministry of the Attorney General on
the Brydges wording within hours of the decision's release. 93 The Halton
Regional Police Force, while not a major user of electronic surveillance,
was not contacted by the Ministry of the Attorney General and was
unaware of their work on the development of a policy in response to
Duarte.
Second, police do not have concise information immediately
following a possible change in the law. In order to begin the decisionmaking process, they require interim advice outlining salient details of
the case, relevant time limitations imposed by the court and, if necessary,
suggested changes in practices pending the development of a formal
opinion. These suggestions could possibly be based on a worst case
scenario interpretation of the decision. It would then be the decision of
the police force whether immediate changes were required or could be
postponed until the final opinion.
The following recommendations, designed to ameliorate these
difficulties, were developed with several goals in mind. Any changes to
the system must help ensure that individual police officers receive timely
and accurate information about required changes to their practices and
procedures. Recommendations must be based on the stated and
observed needs of participants, and effectively exploit resources
currently available. Finally, any recommendations must recognize that,
although several participants interviewed had worked in the past on the
information networking systems in place and had recommended
changes, 94 these initiatives had not achieved substantive results.
Change could occur on two levels. First, the current, informal ad
hoc system could be fine-tuned so that it better serves the interests of
participants. The first step in that process would be the provision of
information that gives each participant a greater understanding of the
role and responsibilities of other participants. For example, as a
response to a decision is developed, all participants could be kept better
informed about the progress of the work. This actually occurred when
the Ministry of the Solicitor General sent all police chiefs a cPIc on
Brydges a week after the decision.
The provision of interim advice to the police is the most
significant step that could be taken to improve the current system. The
93
94

Supra note 24.
Ibid.; and supra note 62.
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Ministry of the Solicitor General could achieve this with a slight change
to the mandate of the opc. The opc currently develops teaching
positions and is permitted to distribute these positions in response to an
inquiry. These positions are not developed by a central unit, but by the
individual instructor specializing in the area. The system, therefore, is
similar to the RCMP'S policy centre approach.
The opc could be permitted to distribute these teaching positions
on a proactive basis to all municipal police forces in the province. This
information, developed by police specialists in the area, would serve the
dual purpose of ensuring that the police are aware of the decision and
suggesting a course of action, which could be used as the basis for the
development of a policy by the force. The opinion's weight would be
enhanced if, as is possible under proposed restructuring plans, the opc
obtained the resources to hire a lawyer.
The second approach to change involves a formal reorganization
of responsibilities by either using current participants in new roles or
creating new participants. The least dramatic change would be a
clarification and expansion of the role of the Legal Branch of the
Ministry of the Solicitor General. While the RCMP are obviously a more
centralized police force than Ontario municipal police forces and have
very different policing responsibilities, the relationship between the
RCMP and the Legal Services Branch at headquarters could serve as a
model for this expanded role. Like the Legal Branch of the Ministry of
the Solicitor General, the Legal Services Branch maintains close ties
with the Department of Justice. The RCMP Legal Services Branch is
ultimately responsible for providing legal advice to the police force just
as the Legal Branch of the Ministry of the Solicitor General could be
ultimately responsible to the municipal police forces.
The Legal Services Branch of the RCMP does not develop the
policies on which it advises. These policies are developed by the policy
centre responsible for the issue subject to the coordination of the
Enforcement Support Branch. Then they are delivered to the Legal
Services Branch for input. The transformation of the Legal Branch of
the Ministry of the Solicitor General into the final advisory body on legal
matters would, therefore, require the centralization of policy
development in one of the police organizations.
The opc is the body most suited to the centralization of policy
development. The opc maintains current information on legal matters
including judicial decisions and legislative changes. It already has a
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system in place for the immediate development of teaching positions
responding to changes in the law. The opc also maintains contacts, both
informal and formal, with all municipal police forces in the province.
The position developed by the opc could be revised and approved by the
Legal Branch and then disseminated to the municipal police forces. It
would include an explanation of why the change was required and why
the policy was adopted.95 The policy would provide police forces with
authoritative direction on the issue and could be used by the police to
implement the judicial decision and to address their practical concerns. 96
A formal reorganization along these lines would have to be initiated at a
high level supported by adequate resources and cooperation among
those affected.
A third, more drastic solution involves the creation of a new
participant in the process. This participant could be a formal unit
composed of representatives from police and government organizations.
The unit would be responsible for monitoring the courts and legislatures
for change, developing policy that implemented that change, obtaining
input from police in the field, ensuring the policy complied with the legal
requirements, and disseminating the information to all police forces.
This solution should be rejected for a number of reasons. First,
resources already exist for the effective implementation of decisions and
it would be excessively complicated to create a new unit. Second,
imposing such a formal structure would eliminate the beneficial effects
of the informal networks currently existing among participants in the
process. Third, the unit would be no more able to provide fast interim
advice to the police than the current implementation structure. Finally,
it is possible that this unit would become politicized and susceptible to
the pressures of too many competing interests. 97

95 The importance of explaining why was emphasized by Regional Director of Crown
Attorneys, Central South Region, supra note 62.

96 This is the role which the OPc is advocating for itself; senior officers at Halton agreed that
this was a satisfactory solution.
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VII. CONCLUSION
Despite methodological problems with case studies, the
approach was suitable for this research. A large part of the research
effort was devoted to identifying participants in the process through
progressive interviews with those involved. More importantly, the
participants' subjective perceptions of the process-critical elements of
its effectiveness-could only be gathered in informal interviews.
Objective facts were also obtained in the interview. These provided a
concrete chronological overview of how police responded to the two
decisions, as well as information from which general patterns could be
perceived.
Nonetheless, this research represents only a starting point for a
broader empirical examination of the implementation process. More
extensive interviews could have been conducted with the provincial
Ministry of the Attorney General and the federal Department of Justice.
Information from the Metropolitan Toronto Police Force, one of the
largest and most self-reliant municipal police forces in the country,
would have provided a third contrast to the two forces interviewed.
Many participants mentioned that Supreme Court decisions
were relatively easier to respond to since the Court was, right or wrong,
the final word. Court of Appeal decisions or local provincial court
decisions are more difficult, both because there is the possibility that
these decisions would be overruled on appeal and because the police
forces affected do not have the benefit of assistance from other forces.
Discussion of the Bethune case, decided by the Supreme Court of British
Columbia, provided an indication of how some participants cope with
this uncertainty. Future studies could delve more thoroughly into this
area.
The police have managed to cope with new requirements
imposed by the Charterand have effectively implemented changes to
standard procedures. Although these changes may not constitute "tidal
waves and earthquakes," the Charterhas clearly had an indelible impact
on police forces and on the formal and informal relationships between
police and government organizations. Supreme Court Charterdecisions
have required police to look for support outside the police force and
have pressured government organizations to reassess their
responsibilities to the police.

